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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, 
Petitioner, Case No. 940179-CA 
v. 
CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD and Priority No. 14 
MICHAEL DEAN HUMMEL, : 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Career Service 
Review Board ("CSRB" or "Board") affirming the decision of its 
hearing officer which reversed grievant's termination from 
employment by the Utah Department of Corrections ("UDC" or 
"Department"). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1993). Relief is 
appropriate under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (4) (b) , (d)
 # and 
(h) (iv) (1989) . 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the Career Service Review Board misapply the law in 
holding that a finding of unlawful conduct in violation of 
Department policy requires a criminal conviction? 
Agency decisions regarding questions of general law are 
reviewed for correctness. Utah Dep't of Corrections v. Despain. 
824 P.2d 439, 443 n.8 (Utah App. 1991). 
This issue did not arise until the Board held at step 6 that 
a policy violation requires a criminal conviction. It is therefore 
appropriately raised for the first time on appeal. 
2. Did the Career Service Review Board erroneously fail to 
give latitude and deference to the Department of Corrections' 
decision to terminate grievant from Department employment? 
An agency decision based on interpretation or construction of 
general law is reviewed without deference for correctness. Id. An 
agency's application of its own rules is reviewed for 
reasonableness and rationality under an intermediate standard "of 
some, but not total, deference." Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec. 
860 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1993). 
This issue was preserved for appeal at the step 5 level at R. 
371-77 and 1112-20, and in the Department's step 6 brief at R. 44. 
3. Did the Career Service Review Board erroneously hold the 
Department's sanction of termination unreasonable? 
The CSRB's decision to affirm or reverse a termination 
decision is a question of applying its rules to the facts and is 
reviewed for reasonableness and rationality under an intermediate 
standard giving some, but not total, deference. Id. 
This issue was preserved for appeal in the Department's step 
6 brief at R. 58-59. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues before the Court is 
contained in the body of this brief. 
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STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
After an interdepartmental hearing process, the Department of 
Corrections in May, 1991 terminated the public employment of 
Michael Dean Hummel, a security and enforcement officer. This 
sanction was for Hummel's violation of three separate departmental 
policies. The three violations were based on: Hummel's criminal 
physical abuse of his young daughter, which he admitted in the 
course of his prosecution and eventual guilty plea; his failure to 
report the criminal charge and prosecution to his Department 
supervisors; and his belligerent and disrespectful conduct before 
the criminal sentencing judge. 
In its February 23, 1994 decision on administrative appeal of 
the disciplinary action, the Career Service Review Board threw out 
the first policy violation because, in the interim, the plea-based 
criminal conviction had been set aside in a post-conviction 
proceeding. The Board reasoned there could be no unlawful conduct 
in violation of Department policy without a valid criminal 
conviction in place. The Board discarded the third policy 
violation, accepting its hearing officer's finding that the taped 
interchange between Hummel and the criminal sentencing judge did 
not demonstrate that Hummel had brought discredit upon the 
Department. Finally, the Board concluded that the sanction of 
termination for the one remaining policy violation, failure to 
notify the Department of the criminal prosecution for child abuse, 
was unreasonable. The Board ordered Hummel reinstated with back 
pay. 
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The Department of Corrections then brought this petition under 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4) for judicial review of the Board's 
final action. 
pT&TTgMTgi^ r Q F FACTS 
Grievant Michael Dean Hummel began employment with the 
Department of Corrections in December of 1987 as a security and 
enforcement officer. R. 825-26. On November 3, 1989, after 
learning of his arrest and plea of guilty on a charge of criminally 
abusing his minor daughter, the Department served grievant with an 
administrative complaint charging three violations of departmental 
policy and procedure. R.266-70.l Grievant appeared before the 
Department's administrative law judge on April 25, 1990, for an 
evidentiary hearing on the disciplinary charges. R. 271. 
Grievant's attorney subsequently moved to stay the Department's 
disciplinary proceedings pending grievant's efforts to withdraw his 
plea of guilty to the criminal charge based on his daughter's 
recantation. R. 10 at % 14; R. 273. The criminal trial court 
found the recantation unconvincing and the motion to withdraw plea 
untimely, and consequently ruled against grievant. R. 835. 
Nonetheless, the administrative stay was continued while grievant 
appealed the denial of his motion first to this Court, which 
affirmed the trial court in November, 1990, and then by petition 
lGrievant was charged with violations of Utah Department of 
Corrections Policies and Procedures AE 02/03.37, Unlawful Conduct: 
AE 02/02.02, Member Responsibility; and AE 02/03.01, Standard of 
Conduct. Relevant text of these provisions is contained in 
Addendum A of the separately bound Addenda. 
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for writ of certiorari to the Utah Supreme Court, which denied the 
petition on March 5, 1991. R. 273; R. 10 at 1 14-15. 
On May 10, 1991, the Department's administrative law judge 
filed a report and recommendation in the disciplinary action. R. 
271-81 (Addendum B) . He found grievant guilty of unlawful conduct, 
due not only to his conviction of class B misdemeanor child abuse, 
but also to grievant's admission to striking his daughter and 
leaving a bruise on her face. R. 276. He further found grievant 
guilty of failing to report his involvement with the criminal 
justice system to a superior officer and of bringing discredit upon 
law enforcement and the Department by his disrespectful conduct in 
court. R. 276-77. Based on these findings, he recommended a range 
of sanctions from a maximum of termination to a minimum of 30 days' 
suspension without pay, a reduction in grade, and placement in a 
position with no weapon requirement and minimal offender contact. 
R. 281. Grievant appealed the report and recommendation to the 
Department's executive director, but was terminated from employment 
by Department order dated May 28, 1991. R. 282-83 (Addendum C). 
On June 4, 1991, grievant appealed his termination to the 
Career Service Review Board. R. 11 at 1 19. He subsequently 
sought and was granted an indefinite stay of the CSRB proceedings 
to pursue a petition for writ of habeas corpus relating to his 
criminal conviction. R. 11 at % 21. The petition was granted by 
the district court on January 2, 1992, on grounds that the trial 
court had accepted grievant's plea in violation of certain 
procedural requirements of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
5 
Procedure. R. 136-44. All records relating to the criminal 
offense were ordered expunged. R. 145-47. 
On June 3, 1992, the CSRB stay was lifted, and a <£e novo 
evidentiary hearing was held before CSRB hearing officer Robert 
Thorup on seven dates beginning August 11, 1992, and ending April 
12, 1993. R. 11 at 1 24; R. 95; R. 8; R. 21 at 1 3. On May 10, 
1993, the hearing officer rendered a decision containing his 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 8-26 (Addendum D) . 
The hearing officer found substantial evidence that grievant had 
violated the Department's policy prohibiting unlawful conduct by 
engaging in conduct that constituted class C misdemeanor child 
abuse. R. 22 at % 8. He also found substantial evidence that 
grievant had failed to notify a superior officer of the criminal 
charge against him, in violation of Department policy. R. 22 at 
1 10. He did not find substantial evidence that grievant had 
brought discredit on the Department by his conduct at the 
sentencing hearing. R. 22 at % 11. He ordered grievant's 
reinstatement, with benefits, at one grade lower than the position 
grievant occupied at the time of termination. R. 25. He also 
ordered a lump sum award of back pay with interest, less 30 days' 
suspension. R. 26. He retained jurisdiction over implementation 
of the ordered relief. R. 26. On May 20, 1993, the Department 
appealed this decision to the Board. R. 27-28. 
After oral argument on appeal, the Board filed its decision 
and final agency action on February 23, 1994. R. 91-124 (Addendum 
E). The Board concluded that because grievant's child abuse 
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conviction had been judicially overturned, grievant did not violate 
the Department's prohibition against unlawful conduct. R. 121 at 
1 19. It affirmed the CSRB hearing officer's finding that 
grievant's conduct in court did not bring discredit on the 
Department. R. 110 and 121. Agreeing with the hearing officer 
that the grievant's failure to report was substantially mitigated, 
the Board held that this sole minor, technical violation could not 
support termination as a reasonable sanction. R. 109; R. 120 at 
1 16. The Board ordered grievant reinstated to his last-held 
position with benefits and back pay, including all increases as if 
continuously employed with satisfactory performance, less 30 days' 
suspension for the failure to report and reductions for any post-
termination unemployment compensation and gross employment 
earnings. R. 121-23 at 11 1-6. Finally, the Board retained 
jurisdiction over disputes between the parties for a 60-day period 
beginning on grievant's return to active duty. R. 123 at 1 7. 
The Department appealed this decision to the Court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Both the Department's administrative law judge and the CSRB 
hearing officer found that evidence independent of grievant's 
criminal conviction was sufficient to establish grievant's criminal 
abuse of his minor daughter. On review, the Board, contrary to 
this Court's express precedent, reversed the finding of the hearing 
officer, holding that the judicial reversal of grievant's 
conviction mandated a finding that grievant did not commit unlawful 
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conduct. The conviction had been overturned on a technicality that 
did not bear on grievant's misconduct or contradict the evidence 
adduced in the Department's termination proceedings. Given the 
independent evidence of grievant's criminal conduct and the failure 
of grievant's direct substantive appeal from the criminal 
conviction, the Board misconstrued the law in holding that the 
post-termination judicial reversal of grievant's conviction, on 
strictly procedural grounds, mooted the administrative charge of 
unlawful conduct. 
Before terminating grievant's employment, the Department of 
Corrections held an evidentiary hearing which established 
grievant's violation of three personnel policies by substantial 
evidence. When grievant appealed the Department's action to the 
Career Service Review Board, the CSRB hearing officer, rather than 
reviewing the Department's findings to assure that the substantial 
evidence test was met at the agency level, took evidence anew, 
including evidence of events that occurred after grievant's 
termination, and impermissibly substituted his judgment for that of 
the Department. The hearing officer's actions failed to recognize 
both the Department's disciplinary authority and the CSRB's limited 
role. On review of the hearing officer's decision, the Board 
compounded the error by premising its review on the hearing 
officer's new findings of fact, effectively precluding any review 
of Department findings. These compounded errors divested the 
Department of its statutorily vested discretion over employee 
discipline subject to only limited review. 
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Under its enabling legislation, the Career Service Review 
Board is limited in function to reviewing specified personnel 
actions taken by the state's administrative agencies. Both by 
statute and under its own rules, the CSRB determines if the 
agency's findings are supported by substantial evidence. However, 
the Board's present rule, applied by the Board in the decision 
below, exceeds the CSRB's statutory function by allowing no 
deference to the agency's findings of fact. The revised rule 
empowers the Board's hearing officer to make an original 
determination of the facts based on a £e novo hearing. Only if the 
officer newly finds facts to support the agency's allegations are 
the agency's sanctions reviewed for excessiveness, 
disproportionality, or abuse of discretion, supposedly under a 
deferential standard. This bifurcated procedure goes beyond the 
Board's statutory authority. 
Under the revised rule, the CSRB exceeds its review function 
again at the appellate level. By rule, the Board permits itself 
the discretion to correct the hearing officer's factual findings, 
to make new or additional findings, and even to take new evidence. 
Its latitude in disposing of the appeal is, by its rule, equally 
broad, encompassing but not limited to full or partial 
modification, amendment, and supplementation of the hearing 
officer's decision as well as affirmance and reversal. This 
standard, like the Board's standard at the evidentiary level, 
leaves no room for agencies to exercise their discretion in the 
discipline of their own employees. 
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Because the Board failed to apply the proper standard of 
review in assessing the Department's factual basis for grievant's 
termination, and because it misapplied the law in excusing grievant 
from culpability for his unlawful conduct, its conclusion that the 
sanction of termination was disproportionate to grievant's 
misconduct is inherently flawed. Grievant's termination must be 
weighed against the substantial evidence the Department found to 
support its disciplinary charges, not against the Board's 
substituted findings. In light of grievant's three policy 
violations--including his admitted child abuse--grievant's 
termination from Department employment was not excessive, 
disproportionate, or an abuse of the Department's statutory 
discretion. The Board's order directing grievant's reinstatement 
must, therefore, be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CSRB'S CONCLUSION THAT THE REVERSAL OF GRIEVANT'S 
CRIMINAL CONVICTION ON A TECHNICALITY MOOTS THE PERSONNEL 
POLICY VIOLATION OF UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IS INCORRECT AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
By administrative complaint, the Department charged grievant 
with three violations of Department policy. Of the three charged 
violations, "[t]he most serious matter in this case is the 
conviction for child abuse" (R. 278) that resulted in a charge of 
unlawful conduct under Department policy and procedure AE 02/03.37. 
At all times relevant to this case, AE 02/03.37 provided: 
A. Any act or conduct that constitutes a 
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wrongful practice as defined by federal, 
State or local law is prohibited. 
B. Such prohibited conduct includes, but is 
not limited to: 
• • • 
5. the conviction of any criminal act. 
C. If a member is under investigation for 
unlawful conduct by any law enforcement 
agency, the Department shall not be 
precluded from engaging in an 
administrative investigation and/or 
imposing disciplinary sanctions up to and 
including discharge. 
In testimony before the CSRB hearing officer, grievant 
acknowledged his responsibility to be familiar with Department 
policies and procedures. See R. 969. The policy it was grievant's 
duty to know and follow leaves no room to doubt that unlawful 
conduct is grounds for termination from Department employment. 
Both the Department and the Board had substantial evidence of 
grievant's criminal conduct before them. The Department's 
administrative law judge found that grievant's own admissions 
constituted substantial evidence of his engagement in an act of 
child abuse. Noting that "Mr. Hummel submitted a hand written 
statement that says he struck the victim leaving a bruise on her 
face" (R. 272), he concluded that "Mr. Hummel's statement to 
Detective Collins that he slapped the victim hard enough to leave 
a bruise, in this examiner's view, establishes a violation of 
76-5-109, U.C.A." R. 276. 
The CSRB hearing officer likewise found factual predicates to 
sustain grievant's violation of law. Like the Department's 
administrative law judge, he took note of grievant's confession to 
Detective Collins "that he had struck Saibrina on the side of the 
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face and had left a bruise" (R. 16 at 1 34) and concluded that 
"there is substantial evidence to support the Agency's finding that 
Grievant did strike Sabrina on one or more occasions in a manner 
constituting child abuse as defined in Utah statutes, i.e. striking 
Sabrina and leaving a bruise with a mental intent sufficient to 
constitute a crime." R. 17 at 1 48. 
At step 6, however, the Board rejected any finding of criminal 
conduct by grievant on the ground that 
[t]his Board has no jurisdiction over 
criminal cases. Therefore, the Board lacks 
jurisdiction to assess what criminal offense, 
if any, has been committed by an offending 
employee. Furthermore, the Board is concerned 
only with employee conduct (or misconduct), 
not criminal intent or lack thereof. As a 
civil service entity, we may only consider 
what an employee actually did, not what the 
employee may have intended to do. 
R. 107. The Board then concluded that because grievant's 
conviction had been reversed and the record expunged, no violation 
of the Department's prohibition of unlawful conduct could be shown, 
as "[t]he matter of law subsumes the question of evidentiary 
proof." R. 107. 
While a criminal conviction is strong evidence of criminal 
misconduct, it is not the only evidence, and it is not requisite to 
a finding of unlawful conduct under Department policy. Less than 
three years ago, the Department and the Board came before this 
Court on the exact issue of unconvicted but unlawful conduct. In 
Utah Department of Corrections v. Despain. 824 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 
1991, Despain, a correctional officer, was administratively 
charged--under the identical provision charged against Hummel--with 
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unlawful conduct for assaulting his former wife. He was terminated 
from Department employment on the basis of the victim's testimony. 
In proceedings before the CSRB, the Board agreed with the 
Department in crediting the victim's testimony but# despite finding 
a factual basis for the assault, "concluded that Despain did not 
criminally assault his former wife because '[n]o such legal 
charge--much less conviction--was ever officially brought against 
him.'w Despain. 824 P.2d at 444. This Court soundly repudiated 
the Board's analysis and concluded that Despain violated the 
Department's unlawful conduct policy under either the Department's 
or the CSRB's view of the evidence. The Court unambiguously held 
that "[t]he fact that Despain was not convicted of assault is not 
dispositive because a policy violation does not require a 
conviction." Id. In light of the Board's awareness of this 
categorical precedent (see R. 25)
 # its attempt to distinguish 
Despain at step 5 is unconvincing. The Board's refusal to find 
unlawful conduct in the absence of a criminal conviction is plainly 
wrong. Its defiance of the Court's pronouncement cannot be 
brooked. 
In addition, the CSRB's statutory role is to review agency 
decisions to assure that they are supported by substantial evidence 
at the agency level. At the time of the Department's decision to 
terminate grievant from employment, grievant had exhausted all 
direct appeals from his conviction. The recantation of grievant's 
daughter had been found unconvincing, and three courts had affirmed 
the conviction. Without a doubt, the conviction was firmly in 
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place at the time the Department made its termination decision. In 
overturning the Department's decision on the basis of subsequent 
events, the CSRB overstepped its statutory authority to review the 
evidentiary underpinnings of agency decisions. 
On June 3, 1992, grievant moved the CSRB to lift the stay on 
step 5 proceedings that had been previously granted at his request. 
The Board lifted the stay the same day. See Addendum F. On June 
16, 1992, the Department's attorney filed a motion to remand the 
case to the Department for reconsideration in light of the reversal 
of grievant's conviction. See Addendum G. After grievant filed 
objections dated June 23, 1992 (see Addendum H) , the motion was 
denied by CSRB Administrator Robert N. White on June 26, 1992. See 
Addendum I.2 Therefore, the Department was never given the 
opportunity to address the new developments in grievant's case. A 
remand would have permitted the Department to determine whether 
subsequent developments required modification of its prior findings 
or actions. By denying the Department this opportunity, the Board 
should likewise have been foreclosed from relying on subsequent 
events to establish the propriety of the Department's decision. 
Even grievant's attorney admitted that 
[w]hatever action the Department took in 
this case in terms of the discipline that was 
imposed of Mr. Hummel, the truth is, they took 
that action based on certain facts that they 
2For unknown reasons, the documents contained in Addenda F 
through I were not included in the indexed record filed with the 
Court by the Career Service Review Board in this case. The 
Department of Corrections, simultaneously with submission of its 
opening brief, is filing a motion to supplement the record with 
these documents. 
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either had or didn't have at the time, and 
that that [sic] decision and the propriety of 
that decision has to be based on the facts 
that they had, not the facts that they didn't 
have. 
I think it's completely inappropriate now 
to come back more than a year after the 
decision was made and try to discover facts in 
terms of -- and ask for admissions to justify 
a decision that was made more than a year 
before. I mean, either there was a basis for 
the decision that can be legally upheld or 
there wasn't, and that has to be based on what 
the Department knew at the time. 
. . . I mean, the Department either had 
a basis for its decision or it didn't, and I 
think that's the issue that was outlined in 
the prehearing conference brief. 
R. 379-80 (emphasis supplied). In objecting to certain Department 
discovery requests, grievant's attorney again stated, "They have to 
justify their decision based upon what they said their decision was 
based on, which did not include any of the information in these 
requests for admissions.11 R. 383. Responding, the CSRB hearing 
officer noted that 
really, you are going to be hurt tremendously 
if we apply a standard that says, was the 
Department justified based on what it found 
and what were in fact facts at that time. 
Your whole case frankly goes to the issue of 
what happened after the Agency took its action 
and that there has been a change in 
circumstances that by definition is 
evidentiary now but was not evidentiary then. 
R. 385 (emphasis supplied) . The hearing officer virtually admitted 
that, without consideration of subsequent events, grievant had no 
case. 
Given that grievant stood before the Department as a convicted 
criminal, the Department's decision was fully justified by the 
facts available to the Department at the time. Given the denial of 
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remand for consideration of post-termination developments, the 
Board should not have considered those events in its own decision. 
But most important, given this Court's precedent in Despain. the 
CSRB committed error in requiring a valid criminal conviction for 
a finding of grievant's unlawful conduct. As in Despain, under 
either the Department's or the Board's view of the evidence, the 
finding of grievant's unlawful conduct--an offense which, by 
itself, justifies termination under the Department's policy--is 
substantially supported and must be upheld. 
POINT II 
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE 
LATITUDE AND DEFERENCE TO THE DEPARTMENT'S DECISION. 
A. The CSRB changed its administrative rule governing the review 
of agency actions during the course of grievant's step 5 
hearing. 
Grievant appealed the Department's termination order to the 
Career Service Review Board on June 4, 1991. On that date, the 
administrative rule governing Step 5 hearings (the "old rule11) 
provided as follows: 
An evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record, with both parties 
being accorded full administrative due 
process. The hearing officer shall give 
latitude and deference to an agency's prior 
decision when the latter is supported by the 
findings of fact based on the evidence. 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-20.C (1992). Under the old rule, "[i]n all 
hearings, the standard of proof is the substantial evidence 
standard.11 Utah Admin. Code R137-1-17.J (1992). "Substantial 
evidence" was defined in Utah Admin. Code R137-1-4 (1992) as 
"something more than a mere scintilla of evidence but less than a 
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preponderance. It is relevant evidence such as a reasonable person 
of an unprejudiced and thinking mind would accept as adequate to 
support the conclusion drawn from it." 
The focus of the old rule was on the agency's findings of 
fact; the CSRB hearing officer simply reviewed those findings and 
their evidentiary basis to determine if the findings were supported 
by more than a trace of evidence that a reasonable person would 
find credible. The hearing officer was not a factfinder but had 
the limited role of assuring that some credible evidence underlay 
the agency's action. 
Grievant's step 5 hearing began on August 11, 1992. On that 
date, attorneys for both parties addressed the CSRB's standard of 
review. The Department's attorney noted that he had received 
correspondence from the CSRB administrator indicating that the 
Board had implemented an emergency change to the rule altering the 
standard. After considerable discussion (see R. 371-77), the 
hearing officer concluded, "And I just want to make it clear that 
at least at this point, I understand that I'm going to be applying 
a standard of latitude in [sic] deference and that you all will 
have a chance to address that issue in writing." R. 377. 
On November 2, 1992, after the step 5 hearing was underway, 
the Board implemented a revised rule (the "new rule"). The new 
rule established a bifurcated procedure withdrawing all deference 
to the Department's findings of fact: 
C. Evidentiary/Step 5 Hearing. An 
evidentiary/step 5 hearing shall be a new 
hearing for the record, held de novo, with 
both parties being granted full administrative 
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process as follows: 
1. The CSRB hearing officer shall first 
make factual findings based solely on the 
evidence presented at the hearing without 
deference to any prior factual findings of the 
agency. The CSRB hearing officer shall then 
determine whether: (a) the factual findings 
made from the evidentiary/step 5 hearing 
support with substantial evidence the 
allegations made by the agency or the 
appointing authority, and (b) the agency has 
correctly applied relevant policies, rules, 
and statutes. 
2. When the CSRB hearing officer 
determines in accordance with the procedures 
set forth above that the evidentiary/step 5 
factual findings support the allegations of 
the agency or the appointing authority, then 
the CSRB hearing officer must determine 
whether the decision, including any 
disciplinary sanctions imposed, is excessive, 
disproportionate, or otherwise constitutes an 
abuse of discretion. In making this latter 
determination, the CSRB hearing officer shall 
give deference to the decision of the agency 
or the appointing authority unless the 
agency's penalty is determined to be 
excessive, disproportionate or constitutes an 
abuse of discretion in which instance the CSRB 
hearing officer shall determine the 
appropriate remedy. 
Utah Admin. Code R137-20.C (1993) (emphasis supplied). The new 
rule, directly contradicting the former deferential provision, 
gives the CSRB hearing officer && novo factfinding authority. 
During closing arguments in the step 5 hearing, on April 12, 
1993, the standard of review was once again extensively discussed. 
See R. 1112-20. The issue of whether the rule's modifications were 
substantive or procedural was also addressed but not decided, as 
the hearing officer concluded that the new rule did not apply to 
the step 5 hearing: "I just want to be clear I am not invalidating 
the [new] rule. I'm not making any comment to the rule. I'm not 
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commenting on whether it's procedurally [sic] substantive. I'm 
simply making a decision that I'm going to apply the [latitude and 
deference] rule as it existed at the time [the case was filed and 
docketed with CSRB]." R. 1120. In light of this ruling, the 
standard of review was not briefed by the parties. 
Even though the CSRB hearing officer had held that he would 
apply the old rule, the decision he rendered actually employed the 
revised standard. In his conclusions of law, the hearing officer 
stated that "[a]t Step 5, a complete reexamination of the facts is 
intended by a disinterested Hearing Officer not connected with the 
Agency or the career service system." R. 21 at 1 2. He then 
invoked a 3& novo standard without reference to a specific 
administrative provision: "Applicable rules of the Board and the 
statutes governing the Step 5 hearing process require that the 
Agency findings of wrongdoing be upheld, after a de novo review of 
all the evidence if the agency findings were lawful and supported 
by 'substantial evidence'." R. 21 at 1 3. Only in considering the 
agency's sanctions did he refer to a standard of latitude and 
deference (R. 23: "Even allowing for the latitude and deference to 
be given to the Agency's choice of discipline . . . " ) , and he 
nonetheless found grievant's termination to be unreasonable and an 
abuse of discretion based on his own findings. See R. 23 at 1 14. 
On review at step 6# the Board noted the November 2, 1992 
effective date of the revised rule (see R, 96) and held, without 
further discussion, that it governed both the step 5 and step 6 
proceedings. See R. 118, 11 5 and 6. The Board did not address 
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its retroactive application of the new rule at step 5. 
B. The CSRB's new provisions governing the step 5 hearing are in 
excess of its statutory authority. 
State agencies are given statutory discretion under Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19-18 to demote or dismiss their employees "to advance 
the good of the public interest, and for just causes such as 
inefficiency, incompetency, failure to maintain skills or adequate 
performance levels, insubordination, disloyalty to the orders of a 
superior, misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office." 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(1) (Supp. 1993). Subsection (5) of the 
statute vests discretion in the head of the Department of Human 
Resource Management ("DHRM") or designated representative over 
disciplinary demotions and dismissals subject to limited due 
process requirements: 
(b) The department head or designated 
representative notifies the employee in 
writing of the reasons for the dismissal or 
demotion. 
(c) The employee has no less than five 
working days to reply and have the reply 
considered by the department head. 
(d) The employee has the opportunity to 
be heard by the department head or designated 
representative. 
(e) Following the hearing, the employee 
may be dismissed or demoted if the department 
head finds adequate cause or reason. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-18(5) (Supp. 1993). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 67-19-7 (Supp. 1993) permits the DHRM director to delegate 
personnel functions to state agencies, except for certain 
nondelegable duties listed in Utah Code Ann. § 67-19-8 (Supp. 1993) 
and not relevant here. The Department of Corrections, at all times 
relevant to this case, has operated pursuant to such a delegation. 
In terminating grievant from employment, the Department performed 
its delegated duties in full compliance with the mandates of 
section 67-19-18(5). 
The Career Service Review Board is established by Utah Code 
Ann. § 67-19a-201 (Supp. 1993). Its authority is set out in Utah 
Code Ann. 67-19a-202, which states, in relevant part: 
(1) (a) The board shall serve as the final 
administrative body to review appeals from 
career service employees and agencies of 
decisions about promotions, dismissals, 
demotions, suspensions, written reprimands, 
wages, salary, violations of personnel rules, 
issues concerning the equitable administration 
of benefits, reductions in force, and disputes 
concerning abandonment of position that have 
not been resolved at an earlier stage in the 
grievance procedure. 
(b) The board has no jurisdiction to 
review or decide any other personnel matters. 
. . . 
(3) In conjunction with any inquiry, 
investigation, hearing, or other proceeding, 
any member of the board may: 
(a) administer oaths; 
(b) certify official acts; 
(c) subpoena witnesses, documents, and 
other evidence; and 
(d) grant continuances pursuant to board 
rule. 
Utah Code Ann. § 67-19a-202 (Supp. 1993). 
It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that 
statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed, 
as far as reasonably possible, in a way that harmonizes the 
statutes while giving effect to each statutory provision. Murray 
City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). Reading sections 
67-19-18 and 67-l9a-202 in harmony, they define a scheme in which, 
as this Court has held, "the CSRB must affirm the [agency's] 
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decision if it is within the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality." Kent v. Dep't of Employment Sec, 860 P.2d 984, 987 
(Utah App. 1993); see also Despain. 824 P.2d at 443. A contrary 
interpretation, permitting the CSRB to substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency by making findings of fact file novo, flies in the 
face of this Court's precedents and renders agencies' statutory 
discretion under section 67-19-18 a nullity. 
In determining whether the CSRB's rule goes beyond the scope 
of its organic statute, the CSRB is entitled to no deference. The 
scope of the CSRB's statutory authority is neither an area in which 
the legislature has specifically granted discretion to the CSRB nor 
an area involving any technical expertise possessed by CSRB. 
Rather, it is a question of general law subject to review for 
correctness. As the supreme court held in Savage Industries v. 
Utah State Tax Commission. 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991), 
decisions involving statutory interpretation, 
issues of basic legislative intent, or 
construction of ordinary terms in the organic 
statute of an agency involve areas in which an 
appellate court is as well suited to decide 
the legal questions as the agency. In cases 
where the basic question is what does the law 
require? the standard is a correction of error 
standard. 
Therefore, the CSRB's assertion of factfinding authority under the 
new rule does not compel a conclusion that the statute warrants it. 
The new rule promulgated by the CSRB purports to give the 
Board powers beyond its limited role of review and in excess of the 
Board's statutory authority. Use of the new rule's d£ novo 
factfinding standard is implicit in the CSRB hearing officer's 
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decision, and the Board's step 6 decision explicitly relies on this 
unauthorized power to ignore agency findings, stating that "[tjhe 
Department's pretermination hearing is not accorded any deference 
under either the UAPA or the Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 1993) , 
R137-1-20 C [sic]." R. 117-18. Because the new rule exceeds the 
Board's statutory power, it must be struck down as a matter of law, 
and the decision predicated on it must likewise fall. 
C. The retroactive application of CSRB's new substantive rule to 
crrievant's pending step 5 hearing was erroneous. 
Administrative rules promulgated pursuant to statutory 
authority have the force and effect of law. See Horton v. Utah 
State Retirement Bd. . 842 P.2d 928, 932 n.2 (Utah App. 1992); 
Higginson v. Westeraard. 100 Idaho 687, 604 P.2d 51, 54 (1979). 
Therefore, "the same principles of construction that apply to 
statutes apply to rules and regulations promulgated by an 
administrative body." Higginson. 842 P.2d at 55. Under these 
rules of construction, "[ejvery amendment not expressly 
characterized as a clarification carries the rebuttable presumption 
that it is intended to change existing legal rights and 
liabilities." State v. Amador. 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 
1990). In determining whether changed language applies to accrued 
and pending actions, this Court looks to whether the change affects 
substantive rights or has only procedural consequences. See 
Washington Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sherwood Assocs., 795 P.2d 665, 667 
(Utah App. 1990) (holding that statutes generally cannot be given 
retroactive effect unless the language expressly declares 
retroactive intent, but noting a contrary rule where only 
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procedural changes are involved). 
The CSRB's new bifurcated procedure, with its denial of 
deference to agency findings, effects a substantive change in the 
treatment of an agency's decision. The new rule, because it 
contains no language to the contrary, presumptively changes 
existing legal rights and liabilities. Moreover, by withdrawing 
the deference accorded to an agency's factual findings under the 
old rule, the new rule strikes at the heart of the agency's 
statutorily vested discretion over discipline of its employees and 
alters the substantive criteria for decision. The change is not 
merely procedural, "providing a different mode or form of procedure 
for enforcing substantive rights," Pilcher v. State. 663 P.2d 450, 
455 (Utah 1983), but explicitly isolates agency findings from the 
review it is CSRB's statutory duty to perform. Because the new 
rule alters the agency's substantive rights, it cannot be applied 
to actions, like grievant's step 5 hearing, that were accrued and 
pending when it became effective. Instead, even if the new rule is 
not beyond the CSRB's statutory authority, the Department's 
findings of fact were entitled to a deferential review limited, 
under the old rule, to a determination of whether the Department 
had any credible evidence on which to base its termination 
decision. 
The effect of the new rule on the substantive rights of the 
parties is easily shown. By making new findings of fact and 
allowing no deference to the agency findings, the CSRB hearing 
officer substitutes his judgment for that of the agency as to the 
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facts. If the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach 
different results, the hearing officer's findings may deviate from 
the agency's findings even though both views may be supported by 
substantial evidence of a quantum less than a preponderance.3 The 
agency's entitlement to affirmance of its findings under a latitude 
and deference standard is therefore diminished by the new rule, 
with the consequence that sanctions appropriate to formerly 
sustainable findings may be recast as unreasonable in light of the 
newly found facts. In short, manipulation of the facts under the 
new rule can be outcome-determinative--the precise result in this 
case. 
Because the Board did not make its new rule of decision 
explicitly retroactive, the substantive nature of the change 
precludes the application of the new rule to grievant's step 5 
hearing and invalidates the Board's decision. 
3The CSRB hearing officer misidentified the Department's burden 
of proof at the agency level as a preponderance of the evidence: 
"The Agency only needs a preponderance and the Board only needs 
substantial evidence." R. 24. However, Department disciplinary 
policy and procedure AE 03, as it existed at the time of the 
disciplinary action against grievant, explicitly invoked the 
substantial evidence standard as the Department's burden of proof. 
This standard is reflected in the Department's final order: 
There is substantial evidence [Hummel] 
stands convicted of child abuse and that he 
did not report his involvement in the criminal 
justice system as required. There is 
substantial evidence to support the finding 
his daughter's recantation is unreliable. 
There is substantial evidence to support the 
finding Mr. Hummel acted inappropriately 
before Judge GRIFFITHS. 
R. 283. The CSRB hearing officer provides no reason for 
arbitrarily elevating the Department's internal standard of proof. 
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D
* The CSRB's revised step 6 rule further isolated the 
Department's findings from meaningful review, in conflict with 
controlling statute. 
The new rule implemented by the Board modified not only the 
provisions governing step 5 hearings but also the Board's step 6 
appellate standards. Under the old rule, 
[t]he board's decisions shall be based upon 
the following: 
1. The board's appellate decisions shall 
be supported by credible substantial evidence, 
2. The board's standards of review 
consist of determining: (a) whether the 
hearing officer's evidentiary decision was 
supported by substantial evidence; (b) whether 
that decision is warranted by the facts and 
circumstances of the case on appeal; and (c) 
whether the hearing officer's findings of fact 
and conclusions of law are correct and 
accurate based upon the evidence in the 
record. 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21.D (1992). In conjunction with the 
latitude and deference to which an agency's action was entitled at 
step 5, these provisions respected the agency's proper role: the 
Board looked not only at the substantial evidence underlying its 
hearing officer's decision, but also at whether the hearing 
officer's decision was warranted by the circumstances of the case. 
Surely one relevant circumstance is the deference due by the 
hearing officer to an agency's findings that are supported by 
substantial evidence. The Board's consideration of this 
circumstance under the old rule served to guard against an 
unwarranted substitution of judgment by the CSRB hearing officer 
for substantially supported agency findings, where reasonable minds 
could differ in interpreting the evidence. 
The new rule expanded the Board's step 6 role considerably 
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beyond appellate consideration of the record in the light of 
relevant circumstances. It established a three-tiered procedure: 
1. The board shall first make a 
determination of whether the factual findings 
of the CSRB hearing officer are reasonable and 
rational in accordance with the substantial 
evidence standard. If the board determines 
that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are not reasonable and rational based 
on the evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, 
then the board may, in its discretion, correct 
the factual findings, and/or make new or 
additional factual findings. 
2. Once the board has either determined 
that the factual findings of the CSRB hearing 
officer are reasonable and rational or has 
corrected the factual findings based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole, the 
board must then determine whether the CSRB 
hearing officer has correctly applied the 
relevant policies, rules, and statutes in 
accordance with the correctness standard, with 
no deference being granted to the 
evidentiary/step 5 decision of the CSRB 
hearing officer. 
3. Finally, the board must determine 
whether the decision of the CSRB hearing 
officer, including the totality of the 
sanctions imposed by the agency, is reasonable 
and rational based upon the ultimate factual 
findings and correct application of relevant 
policies, rules, and statutes determined in 
accordance with the above provisions. 
Utah Admin. Code R137-1-21.D (1993). These provisions go beyond 
review of the decision below to allow still another level of 
factfinding and substitution of judgment. By focusing on the 
propriety of the CSRB hearing officer's jig novo findings, the new 
step 6 provisions completely eliminate scrutiny of the original 
findings made by the agency. The combined result of the new step 
5 and step 6 standards is to prevent an agency from any effective 
exercise of its statutory discretion, in direct violation of Utah 
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Code Ann. § 67-19-18 (Supp. 1993) . Like the revised step 5 
provisions, the step 6 modifications cannot stand because the 
result of their application conflicts with the Board's limited 
statutory power. Their invalidity leaves the Board's decision 
without a legal base. 
E* Neither the CSRB hearing officer nor the Board gave latitude 
and deference to the Department's findings of fact in 
accordance with the substantial evidence standard. 
The Board, in its step 6 decision, explicitly disclaimed any 
measure of deference to the Department's factual findings at either 
step 5 or step 6. See R. 117-18 at 11 3 and 5. However, the CSRB 
hearing officer assured the parties at step 5 that he would apply 
the old rule's latitude and deference standard. 
Even taking the CSRB hearing officer's assurances at face 
value, his decision evidences use of a non-deferential standard. 
His conclusions of law state specifically that "[a]t step 5, a 
complete reexamination of the facts is intended by a disinterested 
Hearing Officer not connected with the Agency or the career service 
system." R. 21 at 1 2. An examination of the hearing officer's 
findings confirms his lack of deference. 
1. The Unlawful Conduct 
In his decision, the CSRB hearing officer first makes findings 
of fact as to the Department's allegations of grievant's unlawful 
conduct. See R. 13-17. He notes that the Department's 
"Administrative Law Judge found that Sabrina's recantation was not 
credible," R, 17 at 1 44, but makes his own finding as to Sabrina's 
credibility rather than examining whether the administrative law 
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judge's finding was supported by substantial evidence: "The 
Hearing Officer concludes that Sabrina is inherently incredible and 
untrustworthy . . .". R. 17 at 1 47 (emphasis supplied). At only 
one point in his discussion of the child abuse allegation does the 
CSRB hearing officer refer to what he specifically identifies as an 
agency finding: "There is not substantial evidence to support the 
finding of the Agency that Grievant struck Sabrina or any of his 
children with either his service belt or a clip from his service 
weapon." R. 17 at 1 50. However, the Department's findings are 
contained exclusively in two documents: the report and 
recommendation of the Department's administrative law judge (R. 
271-81) , in which the findings are made# and the Department's final 
order (R. 282), which refers to those findings. Neither document 
contains any finding relative to the use of a service belt or clip 
by grievant to strike his children. To represent that the 
Department made such a finding seriously misstates the facts. 
In his conclusions of law, the CSRB hearing officer held as 
follows regarding grievant's criminal conduct: 
While there is no factual basis to support the 
Agency's finding that "Mr. Hummel stands 
convicted, based on his guilty plea, of Child 
Abuse, a Class B misdemeanor", there is 
substantial evidence that Grievant did in fact 
violate Section 76-5-109 (3) (C), Utah Code 
Annotated, under conditions that would make 
him guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, "child 
abuse". This is a violation of AE 02.03.37 
A(5), although a significantly less serious 
one that [sic] the Class B misdemeanor that 
was the basis for the Agency's decision. 
R. 22 at 1 8 (emphasis in original). The only difference between 
the class B and class C offenses is in the culpable mental state: 
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a class B offense is done with recklessness, while a class C 
offense requires only criminal negligence. Grievant pleaded guilty 
to and was convicted of a class B offense, which incorporates the 
recklessness mens rea. The reversal of his conviction on unrelated 
technical grounds does not disprove that he acted with 
recklessness, and the CSRB hearing officer fails to show that the 
Department did not have substantial evidence to support a finding 
that grievant's conduct constituted a class B offense. Instead, 
the hearing officer attempts to reduce grievant's criminal 
culpability by drawing distinctions not founded in the law: 
In an effort to deprive true child 
abusers of any loopholes in the event of 
prosecution, and based on an implicit and 
relatively recent Legislative policy decision 
that, essentially, corporal punishment is to 
be discouraged, the Utah statutes defining the 
crime of "child abuse" are broadly drafted, 
and suffer the anomaly that a parent can 
strike one child very hard and not cause a 
bruise, and be free of criminal charges; but 
let the same parent strike another child with 
the same force and cause a bruise, based on 
the physiology of the child, and criminal 
liability ensues. This draconian legal scheme 
requires prosecutors, judges, and juries, as 
well as the Agency, to exercise empathy and 
discretion in the face of the great change in 
attitude that is being caused in society 
between the prior generation and the current 
one on the issue of corporal punishment by a 
parent in order to make just judgments and 
punish true abusers while admonishing those 
who are simply loving but corporal 
disciplinarians. At the end of this case, I 
have to conclude that while he violated the 
law by means of a class C misdemeanor, as 
found by substantial evidence, Grievant is not 
a malevolent child abuser, and should be 
treated with a greater measure of 
understanding and compassion than the Agency 
or Judge Griffiths is willing to bestow. 
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R. 24. 
The compassion the hearing officer chooses to bestow upon 
grievant is not supported by thorough analysis. "Criminal 
negligence" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1990) as 
acting "with respect to circumstances surrounding [the actor's] 
conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of 
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist 
or the result will occur" (emphasis supplied)• By contrast, a 
person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards" the same substantial and unjustifiable risk. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1990) (emphasis supplied). The hearing 
officer explicitly found that "there is substantial evidence to 
support a finding that on at least one occasion, and probably 
others, Grievant did strike Sabrina with sufficient force to cause 
some minor bruising in an effort to discipline Sabrina for her 
apparent violations of the Hummel family's code of proper conduct." 
R. 17 at 1 49. Given this finding of probable repeated injury, the 
hearing officer's implicit conclusion that grievant was unaware of 
the risk that his actions would cause physical injury to his 
daughter is unwarranted. Moreover, grievant's law enforcement 
background and former duties make him intimately familiar with the 
use of force and its results. This familiarity, added to the 
acknowledged probability that the incident of abuse was only one 
event in a course of similar conduct, show the finding of the 
Department's administrative law judge that grievant had committed 
criminal conduct constituting a class B misdemeanor to be supported 
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by substantial evidence and therefore entitled to affirmance at the 
step 5 and step 6 levels. 
2. Discredit to the Agency 
The CSRB hearing officer's second specific reference to an 
agency finding comes in his discussion of grievant's conduct at the 
sentencing hearing after his child abuse plea. The hearing officer 
first passes judgment on the sentencing judge and then finds that 
the judge's words excuse grievant's own conduct: 
No unbiased member of the public could listen 
to Judge Griffiths' diatribe and not be 
embarrassed at his lack of control or decorum. 
No unbiased member of the public can listen to 
grievant's comments and conclude that, under 
the circumstances and given their tone and 
context, they brought discredit upon the 
Agency. 
R. 20 at 1 80.4 Again, rather than focusing on the specific 
evidence cited by the Department's administrative law judge to 
support a finding that grievant's in-court conduct brought 
discredit upon the Department (see R. 275), the hearing officer 
4Both the CSRB hearing officer and the Department's 
administrative law judge reviewed a tape recording of the 
sentencing hearing in reaching their respective decisions. See R. 
20 and 277. The CSRB hearing officer specifically relied on "the 
tone of the comments being made" (R. 20 at 1 80) at the hearing, a 
quality that is not ascertainable from the sentencing transcript of 
record in this case. It is clear from the record that the actual 
tape was in the hands of the CSRB hearing officer at one time (see 
R. 722-28) , but it is not clear how the tape was handled after that 
point. The tape has apparently not been included by the Career 
Service Review Board as a part of the record. While the record 
index prepared by the Board contains an entry for "Agency Exh. 
21 - Sentencing," it refers only to R. 301-22, a transcript of the 
sentencing proceeding. The Department, simultaneously with 
submission of its opening brief, is filing a motion to supplement 
the record with the tape recording and numerous other missing 
items. 
32 
made entirely independent findings on which he based his 
conclusion: 
The Hearing Officer heard the audio tape of 
the sentencing proceedings before Judge 
Griffiths and was able to judge the tone of 
the comments being made by both Judge 
Griffiths and by Grievant, and has reviewed 
the manner in which Judge Griffiths deprived 
Grievant of his Constitutional rights to due 
process of law. 
Id. It was on his independent judgment of this evidence that the 
hearing officer entered his finding that "[slubstantial evidence 
does not support the Agency's factual conclusion that Grievant 
acted in a way to bring discredit to the Agency at the sentencing 
hearing." Id. He made no mention of other factors considered by 
the Department's administrative law judge: the fact that Judge 
Griffiths possessed a copy of grievant's presentence investigation 
report (see R. 275 and 190-206) and the fact that grievant was 
identified in open court as a corrections officer (see R. 275 and 
316) . Much of what Judge Griffiths said in the course of the 
sentencing hearing (R. 301-22) reflects information contained in 
the presentence investigation report, and Judge Griffiths' remarks, 
as well as grievant's, should be placed in the context of his 
apparent reliance on it. 
Moreover, the issue of grievant's discreditable conduct was 
addressed at the step 5 hearing by only two witnesses: Gwen 
Rowley, the probation officer who prepared the presentence 
investigation report and was present at the sentencing hearing, and 
Grievant himself. Ms. Rowley testified that grievant was 
argumentative with the judge. R.538. A memorandum she prepared 
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detailing grievant's in-court conduct (R. 233-35) was admitted into 
evidence without objection. R. 539. In it, Ms. Rowley notes 
grievant's repeated denials of abusive conduct toward his children 
and assertions to the judge of power over his own household. The 
memo further states that "while Judge Griffiths was speaking, Mr. 
Hummel constantly tried to interrupt and argue with the judge.11 R. 
234. Ms. Rowley's perceptions are borne out by the transcript of 
the sentencing hearing. See R. 301-22 generally, and especially 
314-15. 
Even Grievant himself admitted that his remarks were ill-
considered and could be deemed sarcastic. The step 5 transcript 
reveals the following exchange between grievant and the 
Department's counsel: 
Q. You said that yesterday, during your 
testimony, you didn't feel that your comment 
excuse me. We don't have the court 
reporter here that was here yesterday so I 
can't read it back to you, but regarding your 
comment, "I appreciate your confidence," you 
said "I didn't intend to be sarcastic"; was 
that your statement yesterday? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. What did you intend by it? 
A. Well, as I testified yesterday, I 
don't really know. Like I said, I was upset. 
It wasn't a thought process prior to saying 
it. It was kind of a situation as to where I 
wasn't allowed to say a lot, and anything I 
would have said I felt was a waste, so that 
was the last comment. 
Q. Well, whether or not you intended it 
to be sarcastic, it was sarcastic from our 
point. 
A. It could be viewed as such. I 
believe it could be viewed a different way, 
also. 
R. 967-68. In response to his own counsel's question, "Did you 
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just kind of lose it or what?" (R. 864), grievant had previously 
responded, "I did" (id.). By grievant's own representations, he 
was out of control. In light of the sentencing transcript, Ms. 
Rowley's unrefuted observations, and grievant's own admissions, the 
CSRB hearing officer's finding that no unbiased person could find 
that grievant's comments brought discredit on the Department 
strains belief. 
Of particular interest is the hearing officer's reliance on 
grievant's representation that he would not have made the sarcastic 
comment "but for his distraught mental and emotional state 
resulting from being falsely accused and publicly humiliated as a 
child abuser by the Judge, and his emotional distress over his 
mother's death." R. 20 at 1 79. The hearing officer found that 
"there is substantial evidence that Grievant did in fact violate 
Section 76-5-109(3)(c), Utah Code Annotated, under conditions that 
would make him guilty of a Class C misdemeanor, 'child abuse'." R. 
22 at 1 8. The hearing officer's finding that grievant had abused 
his child is entirely inconsistent with his reliance on grievant's 
distress over allegedly false accusations of child abuse. 
Given the evidence before the CSRB hearing officer, his 
finding that grievant's conduct did not bring disrespect the 
Department does not withstand scrutiny even under the ££ novo 
standard the hearing officer incorrectly applied. Under the proper 
latitude and deference standard, the finding simply cannot be 
sustained. 
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3. Failure to Report 
The CSRB hearing officer concluded that substantial evidence 
supported a finding that grievant violated Department policy by 
failing to report the charges against him to the Department in 
writing. As with his findings regarding the other two 
administrative charges, the hearing officer drew his finding 
exclusively from the evidence before him at the step 5 hearing, 
entirely disregarding the deference due to the Department findings 
on this issue. He then found "substantial evidence of mitigating 
circumstances, rather than aggravating circumstances, as found by 
the Agency, surrounding this infraction of the Agency's rules." R. 
21 at 1 86. He did not identify specific aggravating circumstances 
that he found to be unsupported by substantial evidence. 
Probation Officer Gwen Rowley testified before both the 
Department's administrative law judge and the CSRB's hearing 
officer. At the step 5 hearing, she stated that grievant "told me 
he had no intention of notifying his supervisor" (R. 507) . She 
also testified that when she advised him that Department policy and 
procedure required him to notify his supervisor of the criminal 
action against him, he responded, "'I don't care about policies and 
procedure.'" R. 515. This testimony was unrebutted. 
Grievant testified to knowing his obligation to be familiar 
with the Department's policies and procedures. See R. 969. He 
also acknowledged that Ms. Rowley specifically apprised him of his 
obligation to notify his supervisors and he admitted failing to 
personally notify any of his supervisors at any time. See R. 970. 
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Given that grievant had constructive notice of the reporting 
requirement through Department policy and procedure as well as 
actual knowledge through his conversation with Ms. Rowley, there is 
no doubt that grievant#s violation of this policy provision was 
knowing and willful. 
While the CSRB hearing officer does not list specific 
mitigating circumstances, he notes that grievant was informed that 
a Department superior had already been advised of the criminal 
charges (see R. 20 at 1 81) , that grievant feared his criminal 
conduct would become the subject of Department gossip (see R. 20-21 
at % 83), and that grievant#s statements to Ms. Rowley "were 
expressed under the stress of the moment." R. 21 at 1 84. These 
circumstances, however, do not compel a conclusion of mitigation. 
It is naive at best to believe that an agency superior with 
knowledge of grievant's criminal conduct would not share that 
information with grievant's supervisors; in fact, the hearing 
officer explicitly found that "Grievant assumed that Mr. Egan would 
advise all other necessary Agency personnel." R. 20 at 1 82. 
Given that grievant presumed the information would be passed to his 
supervisors, his concern over potential gossip is specious. In 
fact, providing a written notification as required by policy would 
have given grievant an opportunity to assure that the information 
reaching the Department was accurate and to guard against unfounded 
gossip. 
As to grievant's stress, anyone accused of criminal 
conduct--the very circumstance that triggers the reporting 
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requirement--is likely to experience a degree of stress due to the 
potential of an adverse outcome. This fact simply does not justify 
a knowing and willful decision to violate policy. Grievant's 
testimony suggests the actual reason for his distress. In response 
to his attorney's question regarding his reluctance to report the 
criminal charge, he stated, "This was embarrassing for me. I take 
great pride in being a police officer and this was an embarrassing 
thing." R. 866-67. Grievant's injured pride and embarrassment 
over his voluntary conduct is no reason to excuse his recalcitrance 
and to minimize his culpability. Even based solely on the step 5 
record, grievant's willful failure to notify his superiors is 
supported by substantial evidence, and the Department's finding on 
this point must therefore be sustained without unwarranted 
mitigation. 
POINT III 
THE CAREER SERVICE REVIEW BOARD ERRED IN HOLDING THE 
DEPARTMENT'S SANCTION OF TERMINATION UNREASONABLE. 
In reviewing the Department's decision to terminate grievant's 
employment, both the CSRB hearing officer and the Board concluded 
that the Department's sanction was excessive for the infractions 
they found that grievant had committed. At both step 5 and step 6, 
the relevant authorities therefore ordered grievant's reinstatement 
and substituted minor sanctions for the Department-ordered 
termination. However, because they improperly failed to sustain 
the Department's factual findings, their assessment of the 
propriety of termination is inherently flawed. 
At step 6, 
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[t]he Board, as a matter of law, concludes 
that the Step 5 hearing officer/presiding 
officer's factual findings are both reasonable 
and rational as based upon the 
evidentiary/step 5 record as a whole as 
required by Utah Administrative Code (Supp. 
1993), R137-1-21 D. l. More specifically, the 
hearing officer determined that Mr. Hummel's 
dismissal by the Department was not based upon 
the "just cause" standard because two of the 
agency's allegations are unsupported by the 
evidence (AE 02/03.37 A(5) [unlawful conduct] 
and AE 02/03.01) [discredit to the 
Department] , and the sole remaining charge was 
substantially less serious and was mitigated 
by factors not previously considered or not 
given proper weight by the Department (AE 
02/02.02 C) [failure to notify]. 
R. 119 at 1 10. The Board's representation that the step 5 hearing 
officer did not find that grievant had committed unlawful conduct 
in violation of AE 02/03.37.A.5 is inaccurate. See R. 22 at 1 8. 
However, because the Board relied heavily on the step 5 decision as 
the basis for its action at step 6, an examination of the step 5 
decision is necessary to place that action in context. 
A. The Step 5 Decision 
At step 5, the CSRB hearing officer "concluded that the 
termination of Grievant's employment was so clearly 
disproportionate to the factually supported misconduct, and so 
discriminatory, based upon the lesser disciplinary sanctions meted 
out by the Agency for more serious crimes by officers, that it 
amounts to an abuse of discretion." R. 24 at 1 20. The hearing 
officer based this conclusion on several factors: (1) the 
Department's failure "to give sufficient weight to the mitigating 
circumstances in this case, including Grievant's prior good work 
history as evidenced by his satisfactory performance evaluations, 
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and the stressful circumstances in which the events leading to the 
disciplinary action occurred" (R. 22 at 1 12); (2) a lack of 
substantial evidence surrounding unspecified aggravating 
circumstances found by the Department (see R. 23 at 1 13); (3) the 
hearing officer's conclusion that grievant's criminal conduct 
constituted only a class C misdemeanor, rather than the class B 
misdemeanor to which grievant pleaded guilty (see R. 22 at 1 8 and 
R. 23 at 1 14) ; and (4) the fact that the Department based its 
sanction on grievant's guilt of three disciplinary infractions 
rather than the two violations found at the step 5 level (see R. 23 
at 1 14) . The hearing officer further based his conclusion on a 
cursory review of other Department disciplinary documents contained 
in grievant's exhibit no. 13 (Addendum I) , relying particularly on 
case nos. 32 and 33 (see R. 23-24 at 11 15-19). A review of the 
record in this case shows the hearing officer's reliance on each of 
these factors to be misplaced. 
In his report and recommendation, the Department's 
administrative law judge extensively reviewed grievant's 
performance evaluations. See R. 280-81. He noted that grievant's 
performance was rated "standard" throughout the course of his 
Department employment. He also cited both positive and negative 
comments contained in the evaluations. See id. The CSRB hearing 
officer neither referred to the specifics discussed in the report 
and recommendation nor showed the administrative law judge's 
interpretations of them to be unreasonable. Therefore, the hearing 
officer's conclusion that the Department failed to give sufficient 
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weight to grievant's work record is entirely unsupported and 
deserves no credence. 
The hearing officer's reliance on grievant's stressful 
circumstances is likewise misplaced. Any stress related to the 
criminal charge against grievant was of grievant's own making. To 
excuse grievant from responsibility for his policy violations on 
the basis of stress created by his voluntary criminal acts would be 
to justify his misconduct. While the death of grievant's mother on 
July 17, 1989 was unfortunate, the death of a close relative is not 
an unusual or unexpected source of stress in ordinary life. 
Moreover, it preceded the August 22, 1989 interview with Gwen 
Rowley (see R. 512), during which grievant refused to advise his 
supervisors of the criminal charge, by over a month and his 
disrespectful conduct to the court at the October 10, 1989 
sentencing hearing (see R. 301) by nearly three months. To suggest 
that he was still operating under the immediate influence of this 
earlier stress contorts reality. 
The only aggravating circumstance relied on by the Department 
in reaching the termination decision was grievant's position as a 
certified peace officer. See R. 277 and 283. The CSRB hearing 
officer did not comment on or controvert grievant's peace officer 
status and the high standard of conduct expected of law enforcement 
personnel. Therefore, the hearing officer's reliance on an 
asserted lack of substantial evidence surrounding unenumerated 
aggravating circumstances is totally unfounded and cannot be 
sustained. 
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As discussed above, the hearing officer did not address the 
culpable mental state for a class B misdemeanor in determining that 
grievant had committed conduct arising only to class C misdemeanor 
status. The lack of an articulated rationale for rejecting a 
finding of class B conduct provides no ground for overturning the 
Department's decision and casts the hearing officer's own finding 
in doubt. 
Because all three of the Department's charges against grievant 
are supported by substantial evidence, the hearing officer erred in 
predicating his determination of excessive sanctions on only two 
policy violations. As discussed at length above, the fact that 
reasonable minds may differ in interpreting the evidence does not 
permit the hearing officer to substitute his judgment for the 
Department's sustainable findings in order to hold the Department's 
choice of sanctions excessive. Because the hearing officer's 
conclusion as to the termination sanction was erroneously 
predicated on improper findings, it is invalid. 
The hearing officer speaks in general terms about grievant's 
exhibit no. 13 in finding grievant's termination excessive, but 
specifically identifies only two cases as compelling. Because both 
cases were decided in 1992 by an administration subsequent to the 
one that decided grievant's case, they do not necessarily reflect 
the disciplinary standards applied by the prior administration. 
Case 33 is mentioned without analysis only as a recent case "that 
can fairly be used to judge the consistency and logic of the 
Agency's discipline of Grievant." R. 24 at 1 19. However, the 
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final order in that case demonstrates substantial distinctions 
between case no. 33 and the action against grievant. The order 
notes the employee's "consistently positive work performance" (R. 
1478) as opposed to grievant's standard evaluations with mixed 
positive and negative comments. It further notes "his full 
acceptance of responsibility for his actions, his apparent 
cooperation with the arrest and adjudication processes, his 
openness about his alcohol-related problems, his active and ongoing 
participation in counseling, and his consistent attendance at 
Alcoholics Anonymous meetings." Id. These factors stand in stark 
contrast to grievant#s consistent denial of responsibility for his 
criminal conduct (see R. 303-04 and 307), his publicly expressed 
disrespect for the sentencing court, his attempt to keep his public 
conviction a private matter, and his expressed lack of confidence 
in court-ordered counseling (see R. 305-06 and 309-10). Moreover, 
the administrative law judge, in the case no. 33 report and 
recommendation, found that the employee had reported his arrest and 
adjudication as policy required, unlike grievant. He also found 
that the employee's actions, unlike grievant's, did not cause 
injury. Finally, the sanctions applied in case no. 33--a 30 day 
suspension, a three-level demotion and commensurate pay reduction, 
prohibition from a supervisory position for at least one year, an 
unlimited bar on his operation of a state vehicle, and an extended 
corrective action plan including frequent and regular progress 
reports and documentation of continuing involvement in appropriate 
therapy--are substantially more severe than the single-level 
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reduction and 30 days' suspension the CSRB hearing officer found 
appropriate for grievant. The numerous distinctions between case 
no. 33 and grievant's case defy the hearing officer's attempt to 
use it as a lodestar. 
Case no. 32 is similarly inapposite. The CSRB hearing officer 
misrepresents the Department's decision in case no. 32 when he 
states that "no disciplinary action other than an admonishment was 
imposed on the officer, because, according to the order, no crime 
was charged by the police or prosecutor." R. 23 at 1 15. In fact, 
the Department's hearing examiner in case no. 32--a person other 
than the administrative law judge who heard grievant's case-
expressly concluded that the employee's conduct did not reach a 
level constituting a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109, the 
same statute to which grievant pleaded guilty, and consequently the 
employee, unlike grievant, could not be held to have violated the 
Department's unlawful conduct policy. As in grievant's case, the 
Department focused on the employee's underlying behavior rather 
than any legal charges stemming from it. The decision of the 
Department's executive director not to impose sanctions was 
explicitly founded on the absence of a policy violation, not the 
absence of a criminal conviction. Noting that "in his conclusions 
of law, Mr. Baksh concludes that [the employee] has violated no 
policy or procedure" (R. 1471), the executive director stated, 
"Because there has been no violation of policy, I cannot impose 
discipline, warning or admonition." Id. This lack of sustained 
administrative charges against the employee stands in sharp 
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B. The Step 6 Decision 
At step 6, the Board sustained its hearing office: iltimate 
findings that grievant- r"inq discredi: 
(see J grievant did, in fact, commit a technical 
violat Is failure to report (see id,) However, 
the Board reversed the hearing officer as to the conclusion ^t 
grievant violated the Department's unlawful conduct policy by 
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grievant's case. It is significant that neither case cited by the 
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Board deals with the kind of abusive behavior in which grievant 
engaged. 
Case no. 22 was decided in 1991 following issuance of a report 
and recommendation by the Department's administrative law judge in 
1990. It involves a correctional officer who was found guilty of 
violating Department policy by illegally killing a bear, for which 
he faced class A misdemeanor charges. Although termination was 
within the range of sanctions recommended by the administrative law 
judge, the Department retained the employee in case no. 22 under 
the following conditions, only some of which were enumerated in the 
Board's decision: a 30-day suspension, a two-level reduction in 
grade, a 10 percent reduction in salary, a one-year ineligibility 
for promotion or merit increases, a two-year ineligibility for 
supervisory positions at the employee's former grade level, a one-
year ineligibility for supervisory authority or an individual case 
load, a one-year ineligibility for positions requiring peace 
officer certification, a one-year prohibition on all participation 
in hunting activities, and referral for fitness-for-duty 
evaluation. Under the terms of the order, any violation of the 
order within one year would constitute grounds for termination. 
See R. 1395. In mitigation, the administrative law judge found a 
lengthy 14-year employment record studded with numerous above-
standard and outstanding evaluations (see R. 1398)f in contrast to 
grievant's short employment history and standard evaluations with 
positive and negative comments. The employee was also "cooperative 
during the investigation and candid regarding his conduct" (id.), 
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of an employee who, "though not convicted in the criminal case, has 
been charge 2 . 
Case decided J- -^ «-» involves a probationary 
correctiona officer whose off-duty alcohol-related conduct 
resulted -related 
reckless driving. He appeared in court in his Department uniform. 
A administrative law judge recommended termination, he 
opined that - . ferent result might obt a :i n :! f th -1 c:>; • of 
non-probationary status The administrative law judge found the 
emp standing performance un l lit' |ob in mitigate his 
misconduct found the employee"n court i 
uniform mitigated by the fact that he was just coming off 
c appearance (see R, 1243) and that he wore 
his uniform at the recommendation ol hin a" I m. rn."i bee . 1 I " 
After reviewing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 
Depar ordered the employee suspended 
without pay for - discretion n) i in Hmp.l ny^n s 
division management; required the employee to send a letter of 
*i I M i i i v l i "Il 11 up nil Ki>i until whom the employee had engaged in 
a verbal altercation; and mandated the employee's i: ee «» aJ • is til on 
before his probationary period expired, when his employment could 
The final order also 
reflects that at the time case no, i, the Department was 
experiencing a personnel crisis due __ JIII "unacceptably high 
mortality rate of probationary employees" (R. 1238) and notes that 
the correctional environment "coupled with strong emphasis on 
personal accountability makes it difficult even for new employees 
with excellent potential to succeed." R. 1239. The order further 
notes the employee's full acceptance of the wrongfulness of his 
actions. Id. None of these factors is present in grievant's case. 
Like the hearing officer's step 5 conclusion, the Board's 
conclusion that the termination sanction was unwarranted is a 
direct result of its erroneous findings. The Department's 
administrative law judge stated that "[t]he most serious matter in 
this case is the conviction for child abuse" (R. 278) based on its 
adverse reflection on grievant's calling as an officer and the 
doubt into which it cast his ability to perform his official 
functions. By erroneously holding, contrary to this Court's 
Despain pronouncement, that grievant did not commit unlawful 
conduct, the Board removed the most serious violation from 
consideration. Moreover, it compounded the errors committed at 
step 5 by reviewing only the improper £l£ novo findings of its 
hearing officer. Had the Board properly viewed grievant's 
termination in the context of the three violations supported by 
substantial record evidence, it could only have concluded that 
grievant's termination was well within the bounds of reason and not 
excessive, disproportionate, or an abuse of the Department's 
discretion. Because the Board's conclusion has an improper 
foundation, its order for grievant's reinstatement and ancillary 
relief must be overturned. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Career Service Review Board 
powers :ts exercise of power beyond statutory jurisdiction 
cam i implement excessive 
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Gri evgrit";"" "'"•! termination from employment ^ amply supported by 
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conduct. The Board's error in ordering his reinstatement must be 
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Foi the foregoing reasons, the Utah Depax 3 
respectfully requests this Court to reverse decision 
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Career Service Review Board and to reinstate the Department's order 
of termination• 
Dated this ZTWlx day of July, 1994. 
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